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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND
THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION:

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court, New York County, recently decided the
case of Hope v. Perales,1 which challenged the funding scheme
of the state prenatal care assistance program for indigent
mothers. 2 The funding scheme provided coverage for all
medically necessary procedures except abortions without regard
for the risk to the life of the mother in bringing the fetus to
term. 3 In the face of the United States Supreme Court's retreat
from broadly defining the scope of the right of privacy, 4 the
plaintiffs brought suit to adjudicate the question of a right of

1. 150 Misc. 2d 985, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. New York County

1991).
2. Id. at 986, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 976.

3. Id. at 986-87, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
4. See generally Eileen Kaufman, Abortion Rights: 7he Supreme Court
and Local Government Law 1989-90 Term, 7 TOURO L. REv. 457 (1991)
(discussing the Supreme Court's abortion decisions including Hodgson v.

Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990), Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490 (1989), and the Court's retreat from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)); William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (discussing the Supreme
Court's recent retreat from the protection of individual rights and the
implications of state court activism).
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privacy guaranteed by the New York State Constitution. 5 The
court held that the funding scheme violated the plaintiffs'
fundamental rights of privacy6 as guaranteed by the New York
State Constitution's due process clause 7 because it impermissibly
burdened those rights without a corresponding compelling state
interest. 8
The fundamental right of privacy incorporates more than the
ability to procure an abortion. It implicates the autonomy of a
person to decide: the course of his or her medical treatment;
when medical treatment can be refused; when life sustaining
treatment can be discontinued; the way to rear children; what acts
consenting adults can perform in the sanctity of a bedroom;
whether or not to utilize contraceptives; and the ability to engage
in procreative choice. 9 This right to be let alone to make one's
own personal decisions free from interference from the state
demonstrates the high regard for freedom, autonomy and life
itself. 10 A state recognizing this high regard can and must
5. Constance L. Hays, Suit Seeks New Abortion Protection, N.Y. TIMES,
September 25, 1990, at B4.
6. Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 991-92, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 976-77.
7. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (providing in pertinent part: "[n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law").
8. Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 991-92, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
9. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972)
(extending the right to sexual privacy recognized in Griswold to unmarried
individuals); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (recognizing
married couple's right to privacy in choosing to use contraceptives); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 537 (1942) (the Court began to recognize a right to
privacy in sexual and reproductive matters by overturning a statute requiring
compulsory sterilization of persons convicted of felonies involving moral
turpitude); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518-20 (1925)
(affirming parental rights to employ private and parochial teachers through
choice of private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-02 (1923)
(restricting the teaching of foreign language infringes on the liberty interest of
parents to engage teachers to instruct their children); but see Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding Georgia sodomy statute did not
violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals).
10. Conversely, the state may argue that its interference is justified by its
interest in preserving and protecting life. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163-64 (1973) (finding that the state may regulate or proscribe abortion
to promote its interest in the preservation of human life); Cruzan v. Harmon,
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recognize this fundamental right and give effect to it despite the
contraction of its protection at the federal level. 11
This Comment asserts that a fundamental right of privacy is
guaranteed by the New York State Constitution. This guarantee is
independent of, as well as more expansive than, the federal right
of privacy. Part I begins with an overview of the New York State
constitutional standard used to evaluate the question of whether a
fundamental right should be afforded a broader protection under
the state constitution than that which arises under the Federal
Constitution. Part I also includes an analysis of the approach
taken by some other states faced with the right of privacy
question, and their constitutional provisions that have been at
issue. Part II contains an application of the New York State
standard to the general question of whether there is a fundamental
right of privacy under the New York State Constitution,
analyzing its basis and scope. Part III outlines recent
developments in federal law and concludes that the right of
privacy has a separate basis under the New York State
Constitution demanding more protection than that afforded at the
federal level.
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Overview

In a constitutional inquiry, where an asserted right is protected
under both the state and federal constitutions, New York State
courts utilize the standard articulated by the United States
760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en bane) (in guardians' unsuccessful action

to discontinue artificial hydration and nutrition for patient in vegetative state,
the court noted "[tihe state's relevant interest is in life, both its preservation

and its sanctity"), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
11. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that "general limitations on the powers of
Government... do not forbid the United States or the states from meeting
modem conditions or regulations") (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court as the minimum level of protection. 12 With the
federal protection as its base, the court utilizes similar provisions
in the state constitution to expand upon those rights, especially
13
where the asserted right is a matter of local concern.
An interpretive and non-interpretive analysis of provisions of
the New York State Constitution is undertaken to determine
whether a fundamental right guaranteed by both the federal and
state constitutions is to be afforded a broader scope of protection
under the state provision. 14 Courts utilizing this scheme to
determine the scope of state protection afforded fundamental
rights review the text of the provision granting the right and the

underlying reasons for the presence of the provision within the
state constitution. 15 In some cases, a court will also consider
practical considerations such as the need for uniformity between

12. See, e.g., People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553,
557, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1986). The Erie County
District Attorney sought a court order to close a bookstore, which sold adult
books and showed sexually explicit movies, claiming it was a public nuisance.
Id. at 555, 503 N.E.2d at 493, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 845. The New York Court of
Appeals found that in view of its long history of fostering freedom of
expression, the minimal national standard established by the United States
Supreme Court for first amendment rights could not be considered dispositive
in determining New York State's constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression. Id. at 557-58, 503 N.E.2d at 494-95, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846-47.
13. See, e.g., id. at 557, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846 (stating
that "freedom of expression in books, movies and the arts . . . is a matter
essentially governed by community standards").
14. See, e.g., People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 378, 515 N.E.2d 898,
899, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (1987) (stating that "regardless of whether there
exists a federal constitutional provision parallel to a state provision, we must
undertake a 'non-interpretive' analysis, proceeding from a 'judicial perception
of sound policy, justice and fundamental fairness"') (quoting People v. P.J.
Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 303, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907,
911 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987)).
15. See, e.g., People v. P. J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302, 501
N.E.2d 556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986) (stating that "[c]ourts and
commentators have identified many considerations upon which a state court
may rely when determining that its Constitution accords greater protection to
individual liberties and rights than the protection guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
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federal and state provisions. 16 These practical considerations,

however, seem to be part of the non-interpretive leg of the
analysis. 17 In all cases, the court analyzes the question by
employing both the interpretive and non-interpretive prongs of
the test. 18
B. InterpretiveAnalysis
1. New York State
Under the interpretive prong of the analysis, the court looks to
the text of the specific passages giving rise to the right in question to determine whether the state right should be afforded a
more expansive reading than its federal counterpart. 1 9 This analysis requires the court to look at both the federal and state constitutions, to determine which provisions guarantee the right and
whether similar provisions are present in both the state and
federal constitutions. 2 0 Focusing on the state provision, the court
then considers "whether the language in the state [provision] is
sufficiently unique to support a broader interpretation" 2 1 than the
comparable provision in the Federal Constitution; whether the
history of the state provision demonstrates an intention to afford
the same or broader protection than the federal provision; and
whether the purpose and structure of the state constitution affirms
the rights of the citizens rather than merely limiting state
power. 2 2 Essentially, the court looks for a textual difference in
16. See, e.g., id. at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912 (stating
that "the interest of federal-state uniformity . . .is one consideration to be

balanced against other considerations that may argue for a different state
rule").
17. See, e.g., Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d at 379, 515 N.E.2d at 899-900, 521

N.Y.S.2d at 213-14 (recognition of practical consideration of federal-state
uniformity appeared at the end of the 'non-interpretive' analysis).

18. See, e.g., id. at 378, 515 N.E.2d at 899, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 213; P.J.
Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 302-03, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
19. See, e.g., P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 302-03, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 911.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (The affirm/limitation element is not dealt with extensively in the
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the provision providing for the asserted constitutional right. The

court then considers the reasons for the textual differences, and
3
whether those reasons are material to the question presented. 2
Materiality in differences relates to the basis for which the state
provision was enacted. 24 For example, article 1, section 11 of the
New York State Constitution provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this
state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of
race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination
in his civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state, or [any] agency or subdivi25
sion of the state.

Adopted during the Constitutional Convention of 1938, the
provision was drafted to provide broader rights under the New
York State Constitution than those provided under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 26 of the Federal
Constitution. 2 7 The members of the Constitutional Convention of

1938 who drafted the amendment were disturbed by federal decisional law that limited application of the Fourteenth Amendment
to discrimination by the state, while not permitting its expansion
cases, but appears to implicate the circumstances of the creation of the
constitutional provisions by the constitutional convention committee
members.). See also Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 148 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1986) (examining the setting which led to the state's first formal constitution
to find the constitution "not only limited the power of government, but also
guaranteed... fundamental rights").
23. See, e.g., P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 302-03, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 911.
24. See People v. Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d 191, 197, 527 N.E.2d 1182, 1185,
532 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48 (1988). If the state provision differs from its federal
counterpart provision, the court will examine the historical basis for the
distinction. Id. If the rationale for the differing text is not material, the court
looks further to find the presence of fundamental justice and fairness concerns
which are left unaddressed by federal law, and are therefore warranted under
the independent, broader state protection. Id.
25. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see infra note 32.
27. NEw YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE,
PROBLEMS RELATING TO BILL OF RIGHTS AND GENERAL WELFARE, VOL VI at
221, 223, 227 (1938) [hereinafter COMMrITEE REPORT].
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to discrimination by individuals. 28 In order to protect against
racial discrimination in all realms of life, including public and
private establishments, 2 9 constitutional convention committee
members specifically sought to make rights afforded under the
Civil Rights Laws3 0 constitutional rights. 3 1 As such, the
expanded equal protection provision was created to be more
encompassing than the corresponding federal provision.
Therefore, utilizing an interpretive analysis, New York courts
would find that the rights afforded individuals who are subject to
discrimination under the New York State Constitution's equal
protection clause 3 2 are much broader than Federal Fourteenth
Amendment protection. The historical basis for textual
differences is the legislative intent to expand equal protection
principles to individuals and establishments without limitation to
33
state actors.

The essence of an inquiry under the interpretive prong of the
analysis integrates three questions. First, is there a textual difference?34 Second, is the difference material to the analysis in ques28. REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF NEW

YORK, APRIL FIFTH TO AUGUST TWENTY-SIXTH 1938, VOL. II

at 1065 (1938).
29. COMmIITEE REPORT, supra note 27, at 224-25 (inclusion of retail and
wholesale places of business in equal accommodation section despite omission
in the civil rights law makes civil rights provisions constitutional and expands
protection to cover these establishments).
30. Id. at 221 (stating that "[a4l1 existing provisions against discrimination
of race, creed or color in New York State are contained in Civil Rights Law
sections 5, 40, 40a, 41 and 42.... ."); see also N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 5,
40, 40(a), 42 (McKinney 1976).
31. COMMrTEE REPORT, supra note 27, at 221.
32. The United States Constitution provides: "[nJor shall any State...

deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
The New York State Constitution provides: "[n]o person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 11 (no state action required).
33. See infra notes 143-44 (discussing the state action requirement with
respect to due process).
34. See, e.g., People v. Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d 194, 197, 527 N.E.2d 1182,
1185, 532 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48 (1988) (noting that the textual difference between
the federal due process provision requiring state action and the state due
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tion, as determined by the basis underlying the adoption of the
provision? 35 Finally, does the legislative intent, historical basis
or affirmance of individual rights by the provision show a desire
to broaden the scope of the right within the framework of the
New York State Constitution? 36 If consideration of these questions indicates that the right is to be afforded greater scope and
protection under the New York State Constitution, the courts will
hold that the state constitution provides greater protection for the
right than that provided by the Federal Constitution. 3 7
2. Interpretive Analysis in Other States
Connecticut courts have dealt with the question of whether the
right of privacy arises independently under the Connecticut
Constitution. 38 The plaintiffs in Doe v. Maher39 sought to have
the state's medicaid funding scheme declared unconstitutional. 40
In order for an abortion to be covered by the program, an
additional requirement -- that the life of the mother be
endangered by carrying the fetus to term -- must have been
met. 4 1 In the face of federal retreat defining the right of
privacy, 42 the Connecticut Superior Court utilized an interpretive
process provision was not material).

35. See, e.g., id. (finding federal rationale fully served New York State's
interest in ensuring fundamental fairness).
36. See, e.g., P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 303, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 911.

37. See, e.g., id. at 302, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911 (stating
"[o]ur decision, however, is also based on principles of federalism, and on
New York's long tradition of interpreting our State Constitution to protect
individual rights").
38. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986)

(class action brought on behalf of indigent women and physicians willing to
perform medically necessary abortions).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 135 (regulation restricted funding of abortions under medicaid to

those abortions "necessary because the life of the mother would be endangered
if the fetus were carried to term").

41. Id.
42. Plaintiffs brought suit on state-based grounds because of the Supreme

Court decision in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), where the Court
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analysis to determine that the Connecticut State Constitution
independently provides its citizens a fundamental right of
privacy. 43 The court held that the state medicaid funding scheme
violated the plaintiff's right of privacy and procreative choice
because the funding scheme violated the state's required
neutrality towards the exercise of the fundamental right4 4 without
a corresponding compelling state interest. 45
The court noted that the rights guaranteed by the Connecticut
State Constitution can be greater than those afforded under the
Federal Constitution if the history of the Connecticut Constitution
or Connecticut law indicates a reason for doing so. 46 The court
first analyzed the preamble to the state constitution in determining the interpretive basis for this right. The Connecticut State
Constitution's preamble states:
The People of Connecticut acknowledging with gratitude, the
good providence of God, in having permitted them to enjoy a
free government; do, in order more effectually to define, secure
and perpetuate the liberties, rights and privileges which they
have derivedfrom their ancestors; hereby, after a careful consideration and revision, ordain and establish the following constitu-

upheld the federal government's denial of funding for medically necessary
abortions for medicaid recipients. Harris,448 U.S. at 317-18, 326. The Court
found the funding scheme did not abridge the indigent woman's right of
privacy because the funding scheme left her in a position no worse than she
would have been had Congress not allocated funds for medical treatment. Id. at
316-17.
43. Maher, 515 A.2d at 148 (stating "the right of privacy is also
implicitly guaranteed under our state charter of liberty").
44. Id. at 156 (excepting medically necessary abortions from the medicaid
program constitutes an infringement of the right of privacy under the state
constitution).
45. Id. (stating that "[s]ince the regulation impairs a fundamental right, its
validity requires 'strict scrutiny to determine whether the regulation was
compellingly justified and narrowly drafted') (quoting Campbell v. Board of
Educ., 475 A.2d 289, 295 (Conn. 1984) (finding school board implementation
of academic sanctions for nonattendance was not a violation of substantive or
procedural due process or equal protection rights).
46. Id. at 147 (stating "[i]t is clear, however, that the federal decisional
law is not a lid on the protections guaranteed under our state constitution").
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tion and form of civil government. 47

The court held that, through the preamble, the first constitution
of 1818 "guaranteed to the people certain fundamental rights,
both explicit and implicit, that could not be abridged absent a
compelling state interest." 48 Because no provision in the
Connecticut State Constitution refers to the right of privacy, this
right is derived from an implicit guarantee found in the preamble. 49 In addition, the constitution in its entirety serves to affirm
individual rights. 5 0 Finally, the preamble expressly refers to
"liberties, rights and privileges . . . derived from . . . ancestors." 5 1 These guaranteed rights were fundamental to the framers

and based on their belief in natural rights. 52 Natural rights, based
in natural law, arise out of an individual's self determination to
exercise power without restraint other than that which inures
53
through nature or morality.
The court found that express reference to rights derived from
ancestors in the preamble54 indicated that the framers intended
47. CONN. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). The Preamble to the Federal
Constitution reads:
WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.

48. Maher, 515 A.2d at 148 (fundamental rights explicitly stated in the
declaration of rights, implicitly recognized in the preamble of the constitution,
and all guaranteed by the due process clause).
49. Id. at 148-49. The Supreme Court of Connecticut of 1895 articulated
that there are implicit fundamental rights protected by the state constitution.
Id. at 148. Fundamental rights may arise from the preamble, declaration of
rights and the due process clause. Id.
50. Id.
51. CONN. CONSr. pmbl. (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying
note 47 (setting forth text of Connecticut Constitution preamble).
52. Maher, 515 A.2d at 148-49.
53. Id. at 149.
54. CONN. CoNST. pmbl. The court also utilized the preface to the
declaration of rights, which states: "[T]he great and essential principles of
liberty and free government may be recognized and established. ... " Maher,
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the rights of the citizens of Connecticut to be broad in
conjunction with the natural rights theory and that all individual
rights derived from these natural rights were not specifically
enumerated in the text of the constitution. 5 5 The court also found
that this provision in the preamble to the state constitution was
older than the Bill of Rights56 and was expansive enough to
secure significant implicit rights for Connecticut citizens. 57 Thus,
the state provision warranted broad interpretation due to its
historical basis, the drafters' intent and its express affirmance of
citizens' rights.
New Jersey courts have also utilized an interpretive analysis to
hold that the New Jersey State Constitution affords a right of privacy separate and apart from the right of privacy as it exists in
the Federal Constitution. 5 8 In Right to Choose v. Byrne, 59 the
state supreme court held that the New Jersey state-based fundamental right of privacy is derived from the equal protection
clause 60 of the state's constitution. 6 1 The court began its interpretive analysis with the language of the New Jersey equal protection clause which states that "all persons are by nature free
and independent, and have certain naturaland inalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and of pursuing
and obtaining safety and happiness."62 The court noted the more
expansive language of the provision as compared to the federal

515 A.2d at 148.
55. Maher, 515 A.2d at 148-49.
56. Id. at 150.
57. Id. at 149 (examining Connecticut case law that recognized implicit
fundamental rights arising from the "purposely broad" language of the state

constitution).
58. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 933 (N.J. 1982) (stating that
"[b]y declaring the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of safety and
happiness, Art. I, par. 1 protects the right of privacy, a right that was implicit
in the 1844 Constitution").
59. 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
60. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1.

61. Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 933.
62. N.J. CoNsT. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
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guarantee 63 and further found "the right to life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness ... protects the right of privacy, a right that

was implicit in the 1844 Constitution." ' 64 Thus, the textual difference between the state and federal provisions was materially
related to the right in question. 6 5 The implicit guarantee of the
1844 constitution was broad with respect to individual rights 66
and the constitution was created to affirm those rights beyond the
mere restraint of sovereign power. 67
Applying the interpretive prong of this analysis, these states
have found that the textual differences in their constitutions resulted from a historic intent by their drafters to alter the scheme
of protection afforded certain individual fundamental rights. 68
These rights were inalienable according to constitutional drafters,
and were explicitly reserved to the citizens of the states. 69
Finding the textual differences to be material, and the general affirmation of individual rights within the constitutions, the courts
held that there was a sufficient basis to provide for an
independent state-based right of privacy. 70
63. Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 933.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing
"materiality" prong of the interpretive analysis).
66. Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 933 (stating that the "state Bill of Rights
...has been described as expressing 'the social, political and economic ideals
of the present day in a broader way than ever before in American
constitutional history"') (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See supra notes
25-33 and accompanying text (discussing New York State constitutional
legislative intent with respect to equal protection in the interpretive analysis).
67. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing affirm/limitation
prong of interpretive analysis).
68. See Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 933 (noting implicit right of privacy
in 1844 New Jersey Constitution); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 148-49
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (noting the purposely broad 1818 Connecticut State
constitutional preamble guarantees an implicit right of privacy); see supra
notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Maher, 515 A.2d at 148 (stating that the 1818 Connecticut
Constitution "ensured our citizens that no branch of government . .. could
encroach upon these fundamental rights except for the most compelling
reasons").
70. See Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 933-34; Maher, 515 A.2d at 150.
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B. Non-InterpretiveAnalysis
1. New York State
The second prong of the test, the non-interpretive analysis,
does not focus on the text of the state constitution per se. Rather,
it analyzes the asserted constitutional right to determine whether,
under a scheme of fundamental fairness and sound judicial policy, 7 1 the asserted right should be afforded greater protection under the state constitution than it receives under its federal counterpart. 72 The court inquires as to whether, under the current
federal protection scheme, there are any fundamental and fairness
concerns of the state that are left unaddressed by the prevailing
federal decisional law. 7 3 If any state concerns are left unaddressed or improperly protected, the court is warranted in ex74
panding the state protection beyond its federal counterpart.
When utilizing a non-interpretive analysis, the court also reviews
the prevailing state law to ascertain whether any existing state
law, statutory or common, defines the scope of the individual
right. 75 ,The court also examines the history and traditions of the
state relating to the protection of the right. 7 6 Further, the court
attempts to determine whether the right is one of local or national
concern and seeks to identify any distinctive expectations the
citizenry has toward the scope and protection scheme of the
asserted right. 77 Finally, the court attempts to determine whether
the body of state law regarding the right has developed as a result
of a diminution of the right in the federal arena, 7 8 or as a result
of the clouding of federal law by "muddied" Supreme Court
71. People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 378, 515 N.E.2d 898, 899, 521
N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (1987).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., People v. Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d 191, 197, 527 N.E.2d 1182,
1185, 532 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48 (1988).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 303, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 911.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 305, 501 N.E.2d at 562, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
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decisions that do not clearly delineate limitations on
governmental power. 79 The New York Court of Appeals has
stated that it will not hesitate to step in to delineate a specific
"bright line" where state power ends and individual rights
begin. 80
In People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 8 1 the defendants were charged
with possession of, and intent to promote obscene material. 82 The
evidence against the defendants, video cassettes containing the allegedly obscene material, was seized pursuant to a warrant issued
by a local magistrate. 83 The warrant was overturned by the court
of appeals because its issuance was based solely on a police
officer's affidavit that the videos contained obscene matter, only
one of several elements required for a charge of obscenity. 84 The
issuing magistrate did not personally view the tapes to make an
independent determination of the obscenity allegation. 85 On
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court upheld the warrant,
concluding that it was based on probable cause as defined by federal precedent. 86 However, on remand to determine the statebased constitutional issue, the New York Court of Appeals found
that the Supreme Court's decision was a dilution of the citizens'
rights and protection against governmental power. 87 The court of
appeals reasoned that the Supreme Court decision "muddied" the
79. Id.
80. Id. The court noted that "[w]e have sought to provide and maintain
'bright line' rules to guide the decisions of law enforcement and judicial

personnel who must understand and implement our decisions .... " Id.
81. 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
82. Id. at 299, 501 N.E.2d at 557, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 909.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 299-300, 501 N.E.2d at 558, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 909. See infra
note 90 (setting forth the statutory definition of obscene material).
85. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 299-300, 501 N.E.2d at 558, 508 N.Y.S.2d

at 909. The court did not require the magistrate to personally view the tapes.
Id. However, in the event that he or she did not view the tapes, the affidavits

must satisfy the probable cause requirement. Id. at 300, 501 N.E.2d at 558,
508 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
86. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 876-77 (1986).
87. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 305, 501 N.E.2d at 562, 508 N.Y.S.2d at
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waters of search and seizure law and, as a result, permitted
government encroachment on individual rights by means of
eliminating a clear delineation between the government's power
and individuals' rights. 88 Therefore, the warrant was issued without probable cause, in violation of the New York State
Constitution article I, section 12,89 because obscenity is a crime
defined by a local standard. 90 The warrant was based solely on
the police officer's conclusive statements that the material was
sexually explicit and no mention was made as to whether the
material as a whole was obscene. 91
In P.J. Video, the court of appeals specifically expanded
Supreme Court decisional law on search and seizure because federal law defined probable cause in a significantly limited way. 92
The court of appeals interpreted Federal Fourth Amendment protection to mean that police were only required to show probable
cause as to one element of an alleged offense in order to obtain a
valid warrant. 93 The court of appeals found this to be a limitation
88. Id.
89. Id. at 309, 501 N.E.2d at 564-65, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
90. Id. at 300, 501 N.E.2d at 559, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 910. New York Penal
Law § 235.00(1) defines obscene as follows:
"Obscene." Any material or performance is "obscene" if (a) the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to the prurient
interest in sex, and (b) it depicts or describes in a potentially offensive
manner, actual or simulated: sexual intercourse, sodomy, sexual
bestiality, masturbation, sadism, masochism, excretion or lewd
exhibition of the genitals, and (c) considered as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, and scientific value. Predominant appeal shall
be judged with reference to ordinary adults unless it appears from the
character of the material.., to be designed for children ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(1) (McKinney 1980) (emphasis added). This
statutory definition conforms to the standards enunciated by the Supreme
Court. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973); see also P.J.
Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 300 n.3, 501 N.E.2d at 559 n.3, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 910
n.3.

91. P.1. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 298-99, 501 N.E.2d at 559, 508 N.Y.S.2d
at 910.
92. Id. at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 562, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (the limited
definition refers to the individual rights perspective).
93. Id.
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on prior Supreme Court law concerning the subject. 94 Therefore,
state constitutional protection was warranted to delineate a
boundary beyond which the state government could not cross. 95
The elements of justice and fundamental fairness warranted a
specific "bright line" 96 drawn by the state courts when federal
decisional law did not delineate a sufficiently clear boundary
beyond which the state could not cross. 97
The court in P.J. Video also noted that practical considerations
played a role in non-interpretive analysis. 9 8 While weighing the
necessity or desirability of protecting an asserted individual right
beyond the protection guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, the
court inquired as to whether the right in question is one that calls
for uniformity between federal and state constitutional schemes. 9 9
The court has stated that uniformity is a factor that will be balanced against the state-based right when that asserted right is
broader than its federal counterpart. 100 However, uniformity is
not usually a critical factor in the determination of whether to expand the asserted right. 10 1 This is especially true where federal
protection for this right is in flux and the right has not been fully
delineated in federal decisional law. 102 Thus, when the United
States Supreme Court is making fundamental changes, limiting
the scope of protection afforded an individual right under the Bill
of Rights, the New York Court of Appeals has held that it is
94. Id.

95. Id. The court did not indicate if state individual protection would be
expanded automatically when the United States Supreme Court retreats from a

previous definition of the individual right's scope. It seems that this is a
significant factor utilized within the non-interpretive test, but is not completely
dispositive.
96. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.

97. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 305, 501 N.E.2d at 562, 508 N.Y.S.2d at
913.
98. Id. at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912.

99. See, e.g., People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 379, 515 N.E.2d 898,
899, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (1987).
100. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at
912.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 305, 501 N.E.2d at 562, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 913; see supra note
78; see infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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incumbent upon New York State courts to protect the right by
defining its scope under their state constitution. 103 If the Supreme
Court fails to draw a definitive line delineating the scope of
governmental power, the state courts have an obligation to define
the boundary as it arises under the state constitution so that
reasonable citizen expectations may be maintained. 104 In such an
instance, the need for uniformity is outweighed by the need for
protection from governmental encroachment. 10 5 Further, the
need for uniformity is of very limited consideration when a state,
such as New York, has a tradition of protecting individual
rights, 106 and the scope of the federal right is not well delineated
or is in a state of contraction. 107 However, when Supreme Court
decisional law covers the concerns of fundamental fairness and
justice, and the state provision does not materially differ from the
federal provision, the state based right will have the same scope
as defined in the federal decisional law. This is due, in part, to
practical considerations. 10 8
The issue in the non-interpretive prong of the analysis is cor103. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at
912.
104. Id. at 305, 501 N.E.2d at 562, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (court discussed
its movement in the fourth amendment area to maintain "bright line" rules
where the Supreme Court has allowed the rules governing police conduct to be
"muddied").
105. Id. at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912-13.
106. Id. at 303, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912 (stating "[o]ur
decision [is based on] New York's long tradition of interpreting our State
Constitution to protect individual rights").
107. Id. at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912-13 (noting that
"notwithstanding an interest in conforming our State Constitution's restrictions
. . . to those of the Federal Constitution where desirable, this court has
adopted independent [state constitutional] standards [to] promote
'predictability and precision in judicial review"').
108. People v. Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d 191, 197, 527 N.E.2d 1182, 1185, 532
N.Y.S.2d 45, 48 (1988). The defendant challenged as violative of due process
the state's requirement that defendant prove insanity as an affirmative defense
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The court of appeals upheld the
defense because it did not relieve the prosecution from proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the mens rea of the defendant. Id. at 199, 527 N.E.2d at
1186, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
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nered in specific line drawing. 109 If the federal line is in flux, or
non-existent such that citizens cannot formulate reasonable
expectations of protection, then the court will utilize the state
constitutional provisions to draw a line above the falling federal
line. 110 If the state court finds that the line the federal courts
have drawn is explicit, but does not take state related concerns
into account, then the court will redraw the line at a higher point
affording greater rights under the state constitution.11 1 As a
result, when the line is explicit at the federal level and is drawn
so as to take into account state related concerns, then state
112
protection will match federal protection.
Such an analysis, as well as an expanded individual rights outcome, is clearly warranted when the scope of protection afforded
individual rights under the Federal Constitution is being altered
by a conservative Supreme Court. Based on prior decisional law,
the citizens of a state can expect a wide range of personal
freedoms and responsibilities. As the scope of the protection
afforded at the federal level changes, these expectations will not
be accommodated by the federal courts and the line beyond which
the state cannot cross will gradually impede upon these expectations as it becomes blurred. Creating the "bright line" at the state
level preserves reasonable expectations of both the state and the
individual. 113
As the court noted in P.J. Video, Supreme Court decisions that
muddy already protected rights "heighten[] the danger that our
citizens' rights against unreasonable . . . intrusions might be
violated.- ' 114 State court adherence to a right once found within
the federal scope of protection, but which is now being eroded
109. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.

112. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 147 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986)
(noting that "'[j]ust as it is wrong to assume that state constitutions are mere
mirror images of the federal constitution, so it is wrong to assume that
independent state constitutions share no principles with their federal
counterpart"') (citation omitted).
113. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
114. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 306, 501 N.E.2d 556, 562, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 913 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
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and blurred by the Supreme Court, represents responsible

individual protection as well as specific historical delineation of
the metes and bounds of individual freedoms and governmental
power.
2. Non-Interpretive Analysis in Other States
Other states have also addressed the question of whether their
constitutions provide greater protection for individual rights that
are mutual to the state and federal constitutions and have applied
something akin to the non-interpretive analysis. For example,
Connecticut has also utilized non-interpretive analysis to delineate
the extent of state power in areas of privacy. 115 As was discussed
in the interpretive section, 116 the Connecticut Supreme Court, in
Doe v. Maher,117 afforded broader protection to the individual
right of privacy utilizing the state constitution. 118
The court looked to the traditions and conscience of the people
to determine if the right of procreative choice, as a component of
the right to privacy, was so deeply rooted as to become
120
fundamental. 119 The court utilized Connecticut decisional law
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 20-70 and accompanying text.
117. 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
118. Id. at 147.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 150. The court specifically cited State v. Butkus, 424 A.2d 659
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1980), where the defendant, convicted of prostitution,
appealed, contending that the statute violated her constitutional right of privacy
arising under both the state and federal constitutions. Butkus, 424 A.2d at 660.
The court held that the state-based right of privacy does not extend to a
conversation of a prostitute in the street. Id. (citing State v. Allen, 424 A.2d
651 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1988)). See also Ochs v. Borelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn.
1982) (in suit against doctor for negligent sterilization process and wrongful
birth of their child, defendants' appeal based on sexual contact as proximate
cause was rejected by the court as an impingement of the right of privacy);
State v. Allen, 424 A.2d 651, 655 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1988) (court declined to
extend the right of privacy to prostitutes "plying their trade.. ."); Foody v.
Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 718 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (the
right of privacy includes the patient's or his substitute decision maker's right
to decline life sustaining treatment).
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to delineate the scope of the Connecticut constitutional right of
privacy and found that it was deeply rooted and therefore
fundamental. 12 1 Specifically, the court reasoned that the right of
procreative choice is an integral part of the right of privacy, as is
the right to make self affecting medical decisions and the right to
122
maintain the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship.
In Right to Choose v. Byrne, 12 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court
also utilized a non-interpretive analysis. In Byrne, the court
looked to the body of state decisional law to define the scope of
the privacy right. 12 4 The court determined that the right of
privacy as guaranteed by the New Jersey State Constitution
includes the right to refuse medical treatment,125 the right to
procreative choice 1 26 and the right to decide with whom to have
sexual relations. 127 Generally, the court has found that the right
of privacy is one of personalty whereby the state's police power
is curbed significantly with regard to decisions about private
personal behavior. 128
121.
122.
123.
124.
privacy
scope).
125.

Maher, 515 A.2d at 149-50.
Id. at 152-53.
450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
Id. at 933 (the court utilized the interpretive prong to find a right of
under the state constitution and non-interpretive prong to define its
Id. The court discussed the fact that the state has an interest in this area

and the fundamental right is balanced against the state's asserted right. Id. In
somewhat less than compelling interest language the court noted that "under
some circumstances, an individual's . . . right to [refuse medical treatment]
.. . overrides the State's interest in preserving life." Id. (citing In re Grady,
426 A.2d 467, 474 (N.J. 1981) (where parents sought tubal ligation for

daughter afflicted with Down's Syndrome)). See In re Grady, 426 A.2d at 474
(where the court also noted that an intrusion into the right of privacy might
require a "more persuasive showing of a public interest under our . . .

constitution" than that which is required under the federal counterpart).
126. Right to Choose, 450 A.D.2d at 933-34 (discussing body of New
Jersey law acknowledging a woman's right to choose whether to abort or carry
a fetus to full term).
127. Id. at 933 (acknowledging right to privacy findings by New Jersey

courts as including sexual conduct between consenting adults).
128. State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 339 (N.J. 1977) (finding state statute

which prohibited sexual relations between men and unmarried women
infringed upon the right of privacy despite state's interests in preventing
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In contrast, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
held that the right of privacy is not protected under the state
constitution, 129 despite the availability of a constitutional
provision 130 similar to the provision utilized to guarantee the
right of privacy in New Jersey.131 In Moe v. Secretary of
Administration and Finance,132 the court held that the
Massachusetts State Constitution's due process clause provides
for expanded protection of the right of privacy arising out of the

federal body of case law. 133 The court relied on Roe v. Wade, 134

Griswold v. Connecticut,135 and their progeny 136 to define the
fundamental constitutional right of privacy, while looking to state
law for a state defined "strong interest" 137 in non-consensual
bodily invasion of an individual. 138 Utilizing the federal right of
venereal disease, preventing increase in number of illegitimate children and in
protecting the marital relationship and public morality).
129. See supra note 58.
130. The Massachusetts Constitution states:
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential
and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and
obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality under the law shall not be
denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.
MAss. CONST. pt. I, art. 1 (emphasis added).
131. The New Jersey State Constitution states: "All persons are by nature
free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness." N.J. CONST. art. I, par. 1.
132. 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
133. Id.at 400 (emphasis added).
134. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
136. See Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 397-98 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
137. Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 399 (the "strong interest" seems to rise to the
level of a liberty interest); see also Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977) (the interest arises in common
law as a derivative of the doctrine of informed consent).
138. Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 398-99 (the court was not required to utilize state
grounds for the right of privacy because adequate federal interpretation finding
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privacy, in conjunction with an expanded state-based due process
interpretation, the court struck down the funding scheme on the
grounds that the due process clause required neutrality in the
39
funding of medicaid once it was implemented. 1
II. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND
THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION
A. Introduction
In Hope v. Perales,140 the trial court relied on the due process
clause of the New York State Constitution1 41 to hold that a state

based fundamental right of privacy existed. 142 Utilizing an interpretive analysis, the court found there are minimal textual
differences between the federal and state clauses. 143 The Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution have
virtually the same language as article I, section 6 of the New
York State Constitution. 144 Further, no legislative intent or
a fundamental right of privacy exists).
139. Id. at 400-01.
140. 150 Misc. 2d 985, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1991).
141. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; see supra note 7.
142. Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 991, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 976-77. The court
referred to the "constitutional right to privacy guaranteed by the due process
clause of the New York State Constitution." Id.
143. Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 379
N.E.2d 1169, 1173, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (1978). The only difference
between the state due process clause and the federal due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment is the absence of a state action requirement in the New
York State constitutional clause. Id. In Sharrock, this omission was used by
the New York Court of Appeals to relax state action requirements imposed by
federal decisional law. Id. (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978), and noting similarities with the case before the court). Although Flagg
Bros. involved the rejection by the Supreme Court of a warehouseman's lien
and Sharrock was a private sale authorized by lien law, both focused on
whether each sale constituted state action. See Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 149
n.2, 379 N.E.2d at 1173 n.2, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 43 n.2.
144. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part: "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property
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historical basis for the 1821 enactment is available. As such, an

interpretive analysis of the due process basis of the right is not
enlightening.
B. Non-InterpretiveAnalysis
Analysis under the non-interpretive prong operates vithin the
individual rights framework of the New York State Constitution.
Specifically, as noted by the New York Court of Appeals, the
New York State Constitution has "long safeguarded any threat to
individual liberties, irrespective of from what quarter that peril
arose." 145 The nature of the constitution serves to affirm individual rights against encroachment. 146 In addition, notions of
fundamental fairness and state law concerns necessarily warrant a
broad degree of protection for individual rights arising under the
state constitution. 147
1. Familial Relationships
In Cooper v. Morin,14 8 for example, the court of appeals held
that pretrial detainees must be provided an opportunity for visits
with family members where they could maintain physical contact.149 The plaintiffs in Cooper were pretrial detainees being

without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The New York State
Constitution provides, in pertinent part, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
145. Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 160, 379 N.E.2d at 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
44.
146. Id. at 161, 379 N.E.2d at 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
147. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 297, 303, 501 N.E.2d 556,
560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911-12 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
148. 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980).
149. Id. at 73, 399 N.E.2d at 1190, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 170-71 (holding
"pretrial detainees are entitled to contact visits of reasonable duration as a
matter of State, though not of Federal, constitutional right...").
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150
held at the Monroe County correctional facility in Rochester.
As a result of "temporary" conditions, 15 1 the women at the
facility were limited to ten to fifteen minute non-contact visits
with family and friends. 152 The plaintiffs contested the denial of
physical contact visitation. 153 The New York Court of Appeals
154
found the state could not, merely for budgetary reasons,
abridge the detainee's "fundamental right to marriage[,] family
life. . . and to bear and rear children" 155 because the detainees
were held only to ensure their appearance at trial and were not
yet convicted of any crime.
During the interval of time between the decision in Cooper in
the appellate division 156 and its review by the court of

appeals, 157 the United States Supreme Court decided Bell v.
150. Id. at 73, 399 N.E.2d at 1190, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 171. The action was
granted class action status specifically including "all women inmates of the
Monroe County jail . . . ." Id. The named plaintiffs were three pretrial
detainees and three convicted and sentenced inmates. Id. at 74, 399 N.E.2d at
1190, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
151. Id. at 74, 399 N.E.2d at 1191, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 171. The use of
existing "lockup facilities" was approved on a temporary basis by the state
commission of correction due to a lack of room for female inmates. Id. The
"temporary" conditions that supported the use of non-conforming facilities for
pretrial detention existed for over five years at the time of trial. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 73, 399 N.E.2d at 1190, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
154. Id. at 81-82, 399 N.E.2d at 1195, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 176 (the court
noted that "'to exalt economic considerations over the rights of our citizens is
nothing more than abdication of this court's constitutional responsibility"')
(citations omitted).
155. Id. at 80, 399 N.E.2d at 1194, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 175. The court
balanced the fundamental rights of detainees against the state's interest in the
maintenance of security. Id. at 80-81, 399 N.E.2d at 1194-95, 424 N.Y.S.2d
at 175-76. The court dismissed additional expenditures for rearrangement
finding that the state failed to satisfy a "strong showing of necessity." Id. at
81, 399 N.E.2d at 1195, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
156. The fourth department decided this case on September 15, 1978. See
Cooper v. Lombard, 64 A.D.2d 130, 409 N.Y.S.2d 30 (4th Dep't 1978),
modified sub nom. Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424
N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979) (court considered state constitutional grounds, though
trial court and appellate division did not).
157. The court of appeals decided this case on December 19, 1979. See
Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168
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Wolfish. 158 This case was analogous to Cooper in that the
plaintiffs were a group of pretrial detainees held at the
Metropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan. 159 The plaintiffs
challenged a number of the conditions at the facility including
"double bunking," ' 160 the "publisher-only" rule 16 1 and strip
searches performed after contact visits. 1 6 2 The United States

Supreme Court, in overturning a lower court ruling requiring a
compelling necessity to continue the challenged practices, 163 held
that absent an intent to punish the detainees, a practice will be
sustained so long as it is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental interest. 164 An example of such a legitimate
interest is the government's need to maintain security at the
facility. 165 In addition, the Court noted that in determining

whether a practice is reasonably related to such an objective,
courts should extend great deference to the prison officials who
166 The
understand the nature of the task of prison administration.
(1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980).
158. 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (decided on May 14, 1979).
159. Id. at 523.
160. Id. at 525-26. In order to provide sleeping space, single bunks were
replaced with double bunks. Id. Of the 389 residential rooms, 121 were
designated for double-bunking. Id. at 526 n.4. However, the number of rooms
actually housing two inmates never exceeded 73, and of these, only 35 rooms
housed double-bunked pre-trial detainees. Id.
161. Id. at 548-49 (permitted inmates to receive books and magazines only
if they were mailed directly from the publisher or book club).
162. Id. at 558 (requiring inmates to expose their body cavities for visual
inspection after each contact visit).
163. Id. at 563. The Supreme Court noted that their "fundamental
disagreement with the Court of Appeals [was] that [it] failed to find a source in
the Constitution for its compelling-necessity standard." Id. at 532; see Volfish
v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that "this standard of
compelling necessity is neither rhetoric nor dicta"), rev'd sub nom. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
164. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 (stating that "if a particular condition or
restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to 'punishment"').
165. Id. at 540. The Court further stated that such security measures "may
directly serve the Government's interest in ensuring the detainee's presence at
trial." Id. at 540 n.22.
166. Id. at 539. The court warned that inquiries with respect to legitimacy
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Court clearly intended to admonish courts for interfering with
any internal administration of prisons stating that "'[s]uch
considerations are peculiarly within the . . . professional

expertise of corrections officials.' 167 In such a case, the restriction will be sustained so long as it is not completely irrational
even where the challenged restriction impinges on a detainee's
fundamental constitutional rights.
In Bell, the challenged practices included strip searches that
were alleged to be unreasonable and therefore in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 168 The Court sustained the practice for detainees who had engaged in contact visits as legitimate and reasonably calculated

to maintain

prison

security. 169

While

mentioning the elimination of contact visits as an alternative
which would obviate the need for body cavity searches, the
Court failed to decide whether such elimination would be
unconstitutional. 170
In Cooper, however, the New York Court of Appeals held
otherwise. 17 1 The court stated that had this case come before the
United States Supreme Court based upon challenging the interference with the fundamental right of familial relationships, it was
certain that the Court would have relied on Bell. 17 2 Therefore,
of restrictions must "spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial
answers to them must reflect that fact ratherthan a court's idea of how best to
operate a detentionfacility." Id. (emphasis added).

167. Id. at 540 n.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
168. Id. at 558. Although the court admitted that the body cavity searches
"instinctively gives us the most pause," they failed to find them unreasonable
under the fourth amendment. Id.
169. Id. at 560 (stating that "[blalancing the significant and legitimate
security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the inmates,
we conclude that" the institution can engage in body cavity searches).

170. Id. at 560 n.40. Although the Court referred to the holding below that
pretrial detainees have a constitutional right to contact visits, it stated that
since the ruling was not challenged, they would "express no opinion." Id.
(citing Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 126 n.16 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub
nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
171. Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 81-82, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1195-96,
424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 176 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980).

172. Id. at 77-78, 399 N.E.2d at 1192-93, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 172-73.
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focusing on state constitutional grounds instead, 173 the court of
appeals found that a heightened scrutiny "balancing... the harm
to the individual . . . against the benefit sought by the government" 174 was the proper level of inquiry. 175 Noting that the
Supreme Court test utilized a "one-sided concept of due process," ' 17 6 the court weighed the state-based fundamental right to
marriage, procreation and bearing and rearing children against
the governmental security interests. 17 7 It found the state practices
did not rise to the level of a strong showing of necessity neces178
sary to abridge the individual's fundamental right.
The familial aspect of the right of privacy was further highlighted in another court of appeals case, In re Marie B., 179 which
challenged the constitutionality of Family Court Act section
1039(e). 180 Marie B.'s mother violated an adjournment in con173. Id. at 78, 399 N.E.2d at 1193, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 173. The court

concluded that "contact visitation [was] not required by either the due process
or equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution." Id. at 75-76, 399 N.E.2d at 1191-92, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 172.

However, the court found "contact visitation of reasonable duration is required
by the due process clause of the State Constitution." Id. at 76, 399 N.E.2d at
1191-92, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
174. Id. at 79, 399 N.E.2d at 1194, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 174-75.
175. Id.
176. Id. The court disagreed with the prior Supreme Court holding in Bell
which required only a legitimate state purpose to justify punishment of pretrial
detainees. Id. It concluded that "[s]o one-sided a concept of due process we
regard as unacceptable." Id.
177. Id. at 80-81, 399 N.E.2d at 1194-95, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 175-76. The
state's purpose for pretrial detention was characterized as ensuring the detainee
would be present at trial. Id. at 81, 399 N.E.2d at 1195, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
Therefore, the court concluded "[tlo this end the State may adopt security
measures intended to frustrate possible attempts at escape or the passage of
contraband from a visitor to a detainee .... " Id.
178. Id. at 81-82, 399 N.E.2d at 1195-96, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
179. 62 N.Y.2d 352, 465 N.E.2d 807, 477 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1984).
180. Id. at 357-58, 465 N.E.2d at 809, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 89. The court

quoted the New York Family Court Act section 1039(e) as it existed before
1985, stating:
Upon application of the petitioner or the child's attorney or law
guardian, or upon the court's own motion, made at any time during the
duration of the order, the court may restore the matter to the calendar, if

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1992

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1992], Art. 2

752

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 8

templation of dismissal order and, under the terms of section
1039(e), the Oneida County Department of Social Services petitioned to have the child removed from the mother's custody without a fact-finding hearing. 18 1 The court of appeals held that the
statutory scheme for presuming neglect or abuse in the event of a
violation of the order was unconstitutional. 18 2 In order to remove
the child in contravention of the fundamental right of privacy of
the parent in rearing the child, the government must show an
"overriding necessity.' 183 The court reasoned that "legislation
which authorizes the removal of a child from the parent without
the requisite showing of. .. extraordinary circumstances constitutes an impermissible abridgement of fundamental parental
rights." ' 184 Thus, under the New York State Constitution the
right to be free from interference in familial relationships is fundamental and can only be abridged when the state can show by
clear and convincing evidence a compelling state interest.
However, the familial right of privacy is not absolute. In
People v. Liberta,185 the court of appeals reasoned that a man's
right of privacy is not violated when he is prosecuted for raping

the court finds after a hearing that the respondent has failed substantially
to observe the terms and conditions of the order or to cooperate with the

supervising child protective agency. In such event, circumstances of
neglect shall be deemed to exist, and the court may thereupon proceed
to a dispositionalhearing under this articleand may, at the conclusion
of such hearing, enter an order of disposition authorized pursuant to
section one thousandfifty-two with the same force and effect as ifa factfinding hearing had been held and the child had been found to be an
abused child or a neglected child.

Id. (quoting Act of Aug. 9, 1975, ch. 707, § 1039(e), 1975 N.Y. Laws 1121
(McKinney)).
Based on the court's finding, the New York Family Court Act was

subsequently amended to delete the last sentence of § 1039(e). Act of Nov. 25,
1985, ch. 601, § 1039(e), 1985 N.Y. Laws 1501 (McKinney).
181. MarieB., 62 N.Y.2d at 355-56, 465 N.E.2d at 808-09, 477 N.Y.S.2d

at 88-89.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 358, 465 N.E.2d at 810, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984).
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his wife. 186 The court held the right of privacy extends only to
consensual acts, even in the marital context. 18 7
2. Bodily Integrity and Medical Matters
In Rivers v. Katz,18 8 the court of appeals held that involuntarily
committed mental patients have the right to refuse antipsychotic
medication. 18 9 The plaintiffs were patients who were
involuntarily committed to a state psychiatric facility and forced
to be medicated with antipsychotic drugs. 190 The plaintiffs
brought suit to enjoin the administration of these drugs "and to
obtain a declaration of their common-law and constitutional right
to refuse medication." ' 19 1 The court of appeals held that the due
process clause of the state constitution affords involuntarily
committed mental patients a fundamental right to refuse
antipsychotic medication. 192
The court stated that the common law of New York afforded
"every individual of adult years and sound mind.. . 'a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body"' and the right
to control his medical treatment. 193 In addition, the court rejected
the argument that the plaintiffs' states of mental illness decreased
their "fundamental liberty interest to reject" 194 medical
treatment. In order to override the patient's wishes, the state must
186. Id. at 165, 474 N.E.2d at 574, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 214 (husband "cannot
justifiably rape his wife under the guise of right to privacy").
187. Id.
188. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
189. Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
190. Id. at 490-91, 495 N.E.2d at 339-40, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
191. Id. at 491, 495 N.E.2d at 340, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
192. Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
193. Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y.
125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), overruled by Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d
656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957)).
194. Id. at 495, 495 N.E.2d at 342, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79-80 (emphasis
added). Earlier the court noted that "it is the individual who must have the
final say in respect to decisions regarding his medical treatment in order to
insure that the greatest possible protection is accorded his autonomy and
freedom from unwanted interference with the furtherance of his own desires."

Id. at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
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show a compelling interest. 195 Compelling state interests include
situations where the patient represents a danger to himself or
others within society, 196 or where the treatment implicates the
police power of the state. 19 7 The state must prove this compelling

interest by clear and convincing evidence and the treatment must
be narrowly tailored to give as much effect as possible under the
circumstances to the patient's wishes. 198
State compelling interests in this area, while including the right
to protect the health of the citizenry, do not include preventing
the natural death of the patient. 19 9 Further, the patient's wishes
will be recognized even after the patient has become incompetent
when they are made known by means of a living will or other
200
clear and convincing proof.
New York statutory law also contributes to the fundamental
fairness argument. New York Penal Law section 125.05(3), enacted three years before the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, 2 0 1 provides for access to abortion services
within twenty-four weeks of the beginning of a pregnancy. 20 2
Thus, the right of procreative choice is inherent in the statutory
framework of New York law without regard to Supreme Court

195. Id. at 495-96, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
196. Id. at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
197. Id. at 497-98, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
198. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
199. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 273 (1988) (stating that a "patient's right to determine the
course of his own medical treatment [is] paramount to what might otherwise be
the doctor's obligation to provide needed medical care").
200. See, e.g., In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 530, 531 N.E.2d 607,
613, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988) (stating that "no one should be denied
essential medical care unless the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that
the patient intended to decline the treatment. ..
201. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
202. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney 1987). This section
provides in pertinent part: "Justifiable abortion act." An abortion act is
justifiable when committed upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed
physician acting (a) under a reasonable belief that such is necessary to preserve
her life, or (b) within 24 weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy.
Id.
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decisional law. 20 3.
The New York citizenry, therefore, has a reasonable
expectation of fundamental privacy in matters of marriage, child
rearing, bodily integrity and procreative choice. 204 Notions of

fundamental fairness warrant the broad interpretation of this right
within the New York constitutional framework in order to meet
the reasonable expectations of the citizenry in accordance with
New York statutory and common law. 205

Ill. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF
THE FEDERAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In addition to notions of fundamental fairness, a finding that
the New York State Constitution independently provides for a
fundamental right of privacy is warranted given the court of
appeals' "bright line" philosophy. 20 6 The state of the right of
privacy at the federal level is problematic. The Supreme Court is
currently limiting the scope of the federally defined right of pri2 07
vacy, especially in the area of procreative choice.
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Inc.,208 the Court
203. New York Penal Law § 125.05 was amended in 1970 to include the
twenty-four week provision described in subsection (3)(b) (set forth at supra
note 201). Act of July 1, 1970, ch. 127, § 3, 1970 N.Y. Laws 170
(McKinney). This amendment occurred three years before the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
204. See supra notes 104, 110, 113 and accompanying text (describing
placement of citizen's expectations in non-interpretive leg of analysis).
205. See People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 297, 303, 501 N.E.2d 556,
560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911-12 (1986) (describing notions of fundamental
fairness in the context of the non-interpretive prong of analysis for expanded
state protection), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1986).
206. For a discussion of the "bright line" philosophy, see supra note 79
and accompanying text.
207. See generally Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989); see also Walter Dellinger and Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the
Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83, 84
(1989).
208. 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (finding that a state has a continuing interest in
protecting potential human life whose strength varies depending on the
trimester of pregnancy).
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held that the framework for the protection of the fundamental
2 09 It
right to procure an abortion was unworkable and unsound.
held, in contrast to Roe v. Wade,2 10 that the state's interest in
potential life arises when the fetus is viable. 2 11 Thus, the "liberty
interest" of the woman to procure an abortion2 12 can be regulated provided the state does so reasonably and with a legitimate
state interest, such as the protection of potential life. 2 13 The
Court retreated from holding that a fundamental right to procure
an abortion existed, as established in Roe, and addressed the issue

of whether a legitimate state interest in potential life exists before
viability. 2 14 The Court retreated from previous decisional law
that resulted in a muddying of the scope of the right. Will an
outright ban on abortions be upheld? Does the interest in potential
human life rise above potentially life threatening health
conditions in the mother such as those discussed in Doe v.
Maher?2 15 Before Webster, these questions would have all been
answered in the negative.
In addition to limiting rights in the procreative choice aspect of
209. Id. at 518 (stating that "Roe trimester framework falls into category of
construction that is unsound in principle and unworkable in practice").
210. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
211. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519. The Court held valid the state's requirement
for viability testing prior to abortion reasoning that the state's choice of
viability as the point where potential human rights must be safeguarded
permissibly furthered the state interest. Id. at 519-20.
212. Id. at 520 ("a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause"
and not a fundamental right).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 504. The preamble of the Missouri act in question stated that
"[the life of each human being begins at conception." Id. The Court refused
to pass on the constitutionality of the preamble because it had not yet been
used to restrict or regulate abortion. Id. at 513. The Court found that the
requirement of these tests permissibly furthers the state's interest in protecting
potential human life because the state in this ease has chosen viability as the
point at which its interest in potential life must be safeguarded. Id. at 519-20.
See also Dellinger, supra note 207, at 84 (stating "the Webster plurality
rejected a decision recognizing a fundamental constitutional right without
explaining what, if anything, was wrong with the decision").
215. Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 135 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (the
regulation in question restricted funding to those abortions "necessary because
the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term").
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the right of privacy, the Court has also limited the rights of
medical patients to refuse life sustaining treatment. In Cruzan v.
Director,MissouriDepartment of Health,2 16 the Court found that
the right to refuse medical treatment was not fundamental, but a
liberty interest. 2 17 The case involved the level of proof required
to show that an incompetent would have refused life sustaining
medical treatment. 2 18
Mary Beth Cruzan was a patient in a persistent vegetative state
who, according to her family, had previously made her wishes
known that should she ever be severely injured with no hope of
recovery, she would not have wanted to continue life sustaining
treatment. 2 19 The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, found
that the level of proof required in the case, clear and convincing
evidence, had not been produced. 2 20 Therefore, the state court
held that life sustaining treatment could not be removed. 22 1
The United States Supreme Court, finding that the state law requiring clear and convincing evidence only implicated a liberty
interest, upheld the evidentiary requirement. 222 Conversely, the
dissent noted that because the right to refuse medical treatment
was a fundamental right, the evidentiary requirement impinging
on that right must be examined under strict scrutiny. 223 The
majority, however, limited the aspect of the right of privacy
implicating the right to refuse medical treatment by allowing the
regulation of that right to be tested under a rational basis test. 224
216. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).

217. Id. at 2851. In Cruzan, the parents of a patient in a persistent
vegetative state brought an action to terminate artificial hydration and

nutrition. Id. at 2842. While finding a "liberty interest" under the due process
clause, the Court still required substantial proof that the guardians' views
reflected those of the patient. Id. at 2851-52.
218. Id. at 2845.

219. Id. at 2846.
220. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 426 (Mo. 1988) (en bane), aff'd

sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990).
221. Id.
222. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846.

223. Id. at 2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 2853 (the Court stated "Missouri may legitimately seek to
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The right of privacy in medical decision making is therefore not
fundamental at the federal level, but merely a liberty interest protected by the rational basis test.
Thus, the Court continues to blur the metes and bounds of the
right of privacy at the federal level. The Court is continuing to
limit the overall scope of the right, permitting greater
governmental encroachment on the fundamental right of privacy
by "chipping" off pieces and "protecting" the separated parts
under the low level liberty interest protection of the Due Process
Clause.225
CONCLUSION

The New York State Constitution provides an independent and
broader basis of a fundamental right of privacy. 2 26 This fundamental right arises out of the non-interpretive prong of the constitutional analysis called for by the New York Court of
Appeals. 227 The common and statutory law of New York provides for, inter alia, a right of privacy in medical decision making, familial relationships, and the exercise of procreative
choice. 2 28 Further, the United States Supreme Court has begun
to decide cases in this area that muddy previous decisional law in
an attempt to restrict the right. 229 The protection at the federal
level is retracting and the citizens of the state have a legitimate
and reasonable expectation that their right of privacy will not be
violated by governmental encroachment. Current federal protection schemes will not prevent the diminution of reasonable expectations in this area. Therefore, it is incumbent upon New York
safeguard the personal element of this choice through imposition of heightened
evidentiary requirements") (emphasis added).
225. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S.
Ct. 2841 (1990); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989).
226. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 148-205 and accompanying text (discussing New York
law in this area).
229. See supra notes 207-224 and accompanying text.
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State courts to delineate a broadly defined fundamental right of
privacy arising under the due process clause of the state constitution. Such a delineation is necessary in order to preserve all expectations, define the scope of individual rights and clearly mark
the limits of governmental power.
Edward R. Alexander

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1992

35

Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1992], Art. 2

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss3/2

36

